The Dilemma of Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-first Century by Turner, Stansfield
Naval War College Review
Volume 54
Number 2 Spring Article 3
2001




Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Turner, Stansfield (2001) "The Dilemma of Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-first Century," Naval War College Review: Vol. 54 : No. 2 ,
Article 3.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss2/3
Admiral Turner attended Amherst College and then the
U.S. Naval Academy, from which he graduated in 1946;
thereafter he earned a master’s degree in philosophy,
politics, and economics from Oxford University as a
Rhodes Scholar, and studied at the Harvard Business
School. Before promotion to flag rank in 1970, he served
in destroyers (including off Korea and Vietnam) and in
shore assignments including duty as executive assistant
and naval aide to two Secretaries of the Navy. As a rear
admiral he commanded a Sixth Fleet carrier task group;
from 1972 to 1974, as a vice admiral, he was President
of the Naval War College, where he instituted funda-
mental and enduring curriculum changes. Thereafter
he commanded the Second Fleet/Nato Striking Fleet
Atlantic and, upon promotion to full admiral, was Com-
mander in Chief, Nato Forces in Southern Europe. In
1977 President Carter appointed Admiral Turner as the
Director of Central Intelligence, a post he held until
1981. Since then he has taught at the U.S. Military
Academy, Yale University, and the University of Mary-
land. Admiral Turner wrote this article while serving as
the Raymond A. Spruance Distinguished Fellow at the
Naval War College in the fall academic term of 2000.
His books include: Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA
in Transition (1985), Terrorism and Democracy (1991),
Caging the Nuclear Genie: An American Challenge
for Global Security (1997, winner of the 1998 Foreign
Policy Association Medal), and Caging the Genies: A
Workable Solution for Nuclear, Chemical, and Bio-
logical Weapons (1999).
© 2000 by Stansfield Turner
Naval War College Review, Spring 2001, Vol. LIV, No. 2
1
Turner: The Dilemma of Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-first Century
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
THE DILEMMA OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Admiral Stansfield Turner, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
For over thirty years the United States, Russia, and others have been at-tempting to limit, control, and reduce the nuclear weapons in the world.
These efforts have resulted in a number of bilateral and multilateral treaties, and
the number of these weapons has been reduced markedly. As a result, we tend to
believe we are making good progress. That is the case relative to where we were.
In the absolute, however, we are doing very poorly. There are still more than
thirty thousand nuclear weapons in the world; we have just seen proliferation of
these weapons to India and Pakistan; the risks of even further proliferation seem
high; and the nuclear treaty process is in limbo. Without both a new sense of ur-
gency and a more imaginative approach to controlling nuclear weapons, we risk
letting the world become one of proliferation to irresponsible nations and
groups that could easily be tempted to employ those weapons in anger for the
first time since 1945. If the two nuclear superpowers continue to need tens of
thousands of nuclear warheads, as both profess to, other nations of the world
will say they need them as well.
The genesis of the problem can be summarized in the numbers of U.S. nu-
clear weapons on three particular dates. Immediately after the attack on Naga-
saki on 9 August 1945, the United States possessed no nuclear weapons; it had at
that point expended the only two it had built. The nation did not know quite
what to do about that situation; it even proposed to the United Nations that a
way be found to prohibit the new weapons. Joseph Stalin would not even con-
sider the idea; in 1949—by which time the United States had about two hundred
nuclear weapons—the first Soviet test detonation was conducted. That began a
race, a spiral that produced a peak on the American side in 1969, at some 32,500
nuclear warheads.
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That had to have been an irrational process. How could Americans possibly
have thought they could use 32,500 nuclear warheads? After all, there were less
than two hundred cities with populations of more than a hundred thousand in
the Soviet Union.
But to put the enormity of these weapons into even sharper perspective: all
Americans had seen post-attack pictures of Hiroshima; they knew that some
140,000 people had died there. The twelve-kiloton Hiroshima weapon had had a
blast effect alone equivalent to some twenty-five million pounds of TNT—that’s
million. It also had, of course, other effects—radiation, heat intense enough to
cause fires, and electromagnetic pulse. Further, a nuclear attack on a city causes
severe societal disruption: communications that had passed through Hiroshima
no longer did, affecting many other cities; products from Hiroshima’s factories
never went anywhere, affecting other factories around the country.
However, the matter needs to be put in context; not all the nuclear weapons
that the United States has built since then have been the size of the Hiroshima
bomb (see table 1). The smallest type was an artillery shell, but even that was a
hundred times as powerful in blast effect as a modern large (two-thousand-pound)
conventional bomb. Re-
cently the Senate Armed
Services Committee talked
of developing a rather small
nuclear device that might
be useable in circumstances
in which the nation would
not think of using a huge
weapon; the smallest one it
considered would have five
thousand times the blast
effect of a two-thousand-pound bomb. Today, the standard weapon in the U.S.
arsenal that could quickly be aimed at Russia (both sides having “detargeted”
their ballistic missiles in January 1994) is 250,000 times as powerful as a
two-thousand-pound bomb. The standard Russian weapon is the equivalent of
over a billion pounds of TNT—over six hundred thousand times the power of a
two-thousand-pound bomb.
CONVENTIONAL THEOREMS, SPECIOUS REASONING
How in the world did this nation ever get to 32,500? The primary reason is that
the United States has always treated nuclear weapons as though they were simply
larger conventional weapons. More specifically, the basic mistake was to apply







0.1 artillery 200,000 100X
5 Senate proposal 10,000,000 5,000X
12 Hiroshima 25,000,000 12,500X
250 U.S. ICBM 500 million 250,000X
550 Soviet ICBM 1.2 billion 605,000X
TABLE 1
LETHALITY INDICATORS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Plus: radiation, heat/fires, EMP, societal disruption
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certain theorems of conventional warfare to nuclear warfare, producing four
misleading concepts:
• The importance of a rough parity in numbers of weapons
• The possibility of deterring an opponent from initiating nuclear war by
threatening some specific set of targets
• A “window of vulnerability” for both sides
• The stated willingness, even today, of the United States to initiate nuclear
war.
Numbers
In conventional warfare, numbers are important. No one wants to have fewer
tanks, infantry, or airplanes than an opponent—a valid enough proposition. In
nuclear warfare, however, where weapons have blast effects equivalent to hun-
dreds of millions of pounds of TNT, it ought to be obvious that the point of di-
minishing returns sets in quickly.
The author once had the opportunity to ask Robert McNamara, who was sec-
retary of defense from 1961 to 1968, how the United States accumulated over
thirty-two thousand nuclear weapons. The U.S. government, he explained,
would periodically receive intelligence reports that the Soviets were starting new
nuclear-weapons programs, apparently with the aim of either catching up with
or exceeding the American arsenal; each time, the United States would build new
systems of its own to counter them. The Soviets, in turn, would learn that the
Americans were building new weapons; they would start new programs to coun-
ter them—and on we went, spiraling upward.
Target Sets
McNamara tried to arrest this spiral by limiting the strategic arsenal to the size
necessary to destroy a given percentage of the Soviet industrial capacity and
population in order to deter the Soviet Union from starting a nuclear war. The
percentages he chose were indicative of how far astray strategic thinking had
gone; they were absolutely enormous, something like 40 percent of the Soviet
Union’s industrial capacity and 25 percent of its population, between six and
seven thousand targets in all. It boggles the imagination to think that in the
1960s the United States believed that it needed a destructive capacity of such size
to deter the Soviet Union. Both nations had bought into a specious reasoning ac-
cording to which the important thing was parity in numbers of weapons, an as-
sumption resulting in an ultimate inventory between them of some seventy
thousand nuclear weapons.
Even so, by 1969 it was obvious that something was badly wrong. American
political leaders were loath simply to reduce numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons,
T U R N E R 1 5
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probably for fear of appearing weak vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Instead, by the
1970s, they had started the nation on a path of nuclear arms control agreements.
At the same time, U.S. strategic
planners began to shift away from
industrial capacity and popula-
tion to military targets, selecting
those they thought vital to deterrence and assigning forces to attack them in
what was known as the Single Integrated Operational Plan, or SIOP.
My first encounter with the enormity of all of this came in the early 1970s, as
commander of a carrier task group in the Mediterranean. I had had no experi-
ence whatsoever with strategic nuclear matters, but I now had command of a
force that possessed strategic nuclear weapons. I sent for a pilot of an A-6 In-
truder, the primary U.S. carrier-based attack aircraft of the time, and his bom-
bardier/navigator. “Bring me,” I told them, “your target folder and tell me what
you do if I’m ordered to order you to release your nuclear weapon in accordance
with the SIOP.” The two young men came into my cabin, opened their target
folder, and said, “Here is our target, Admiral.” I noticed first of all that it was in
Bulgaria. Bulgaria? I couldn’t say so to these people who might have to risk their
lives to carry out this plan, but in a major nuclear war, with thousands of war-
heads going off all around the world, why were we going to worry about
Bulgaria?
The target was a railroad bridge across a river. The folder had a photograph of
it, but all I could see was railroad tracks coming down to the north side of the
river, and more tracks going away from the south side. “Unfortunately, Admiral,”
the bombardier explained, “the bridge is too small to be seen in this photo.” I
came away with the conviction that if we had sufficient nuclear weapons to hit
an invisible bridge in Bulgaria, we were overstocked. Yet today the United States
still has six thousand nuclear warheads aimed at Russia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
say two thousand is about as low as they can go. These are such enormous weap-
ons that it is amazing people still think in such terms.
Deterrence
How should we calculate what it takes to deter? First of all, deterrence is in the
eyes of beholders—what they think is going to happen. If they are dealing with
the very survival of their societies, they have to assume the worst. The worst
would be the other side hitting cities, destroying the society and its population.
In that case, it makes no difference what is put in the target set. Strategic plan-
ners theorize, even agonize, over targeting, but it does not matter: the other side
necessarily assumes that its cities will be targeted.
1 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
How could Americans possibly have thought
they could use 32,500 nuclear warheads?
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The question, then, is, how many Russian cities does the United States have to
threaten in order to deter the Russians? To make a rough calculation, let us put
the question the other way around: how many cities in the United States does
Russia have to threaten to deter
us? Imagine the president of the
United States appearing on televi-
sion to tell the American people,
“There is no longer a threat of
major nuclear war. I have knocked out the entire Russian nuclear capabil-
ity—and all I lost was New York City and two hundred thousand people.” If
there was ever a time when Americans might have thought that would be a suit-
able exchange, would they today, with Russia in the straits in which it now finds
itself, politically, economically, and militarily? No. The United States is deterred
by the prospect of even a single nuclear detonation on its soil.
Yet our nation has continued with this specious line of reasoning—that it
must be able to destroy some given (large) number of targets. Does it really take
six thousand warheads, or even two thousand, to deter Russia? No. It probably
takes the same number as it does to deter the United States—one. But let us play
it safe. Call it five or ten, or some such number—still, it will not be in the hun-
dreds or thousands. The point is to make Russian “beholders” feel certain that if
they start a nuclear war with the United States they will suffer five or ten nuclear
detonations on their cities in return.
To “size”a nuclear arsenal, though, one also has to ask how large a force would
be needed if one ever had to retaliate. It is difficult even to imagine what would
happen—if a nuclear war begins, everyone has already lost. It will not make any
difference whether we ultimately do more damage to our opponent, the aggres-
sor, than has been done to us; the damage to our own country will have been so
great that we will have lost, too.
Still, we can bound the problem, at least on the upper side. A group at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology did a study in 1987 hypothesizing 239 So-
viet nuclear detonations on the liquid-energy supplies of this country—the port
terminals, oil storage facilities, pipelines, and so forth. It found that two years
later, 60 percent of the U.S. population would have died of starvation, because
food could not be shipped. At the end of six years, gross domestic product would
have been only 40 percent of what it had been before the war. Roughly two hun-
dred warheads, then, is probably more than enough retaliation to set any society
back to what we may call its point of nonrecovery, at which it can never again be
what it had been.
T U R N E R 1 7
The United States has always treated nuclear
weapons as though they were simply larger
conventional weapons.
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Windows of Vulnerability
The idea of possessing only two hundred warheads, however, is very difficult to
sell; many strategic planners have strong objections. The first is the familiar idea
of the “window of vulnerability”—that a first strike by either side could totally
disable the nuclear capability of the other side. This has always been a canard.
For over thirty years, ballistic-missile submarines, SSBNs, capable of launching
thousands of nuclear warheads, have been at sea, where they are virtually invul-
nerable. Even beyond that insurance is the phenomenon that Clausewitz called
“friction”—in warfare, nothing ever succeeds completely. Even if there were
nothing but land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), a side that
tried to knock them all out would be lucky to destroy 90 percent.
The United States once had a thousand ICBMs; a 90 percent effective strike
would still leave a hundred deliverable weapons. An attack that was 99 percent
effective—and no one in the military would ever imagine achieving 99 percent
success in any kind of an attack—would leave ten ICBMs intact, which with
three or more warheads each would be enough to deter, if we accept that deter-
rence at low numbers is valid.
First Use
There is still another objection to the United States limiting itself to very low
numbers of nuclear weapons—that it may want nuclear weapons with which to
initiate nuclear war. In 1952, the United States declared that it would employ nu-
clear weapons to defend its Western European allies against a conventional at-
tack, if necessary. This was called “extended deterrence.” It was never a military
strategy but a budgetary one: it was a way to excuse the Europeans from building
large enough conventional forces to defend themselves. The Western Europeans
did not want a nuclear war on their rather limited geography, so they spoke of an
“umbrella,” a nuclear umbrella, over it. By this they meant that if the Soviets in-
vaded and conventional fighting in the area protected by the umbrella went
badly, the United States would launch nuclear weapons—its own weapons, fir-
ing them over that umbrella, against the Soviet Union. Thus all the nuclear dev-
astation would be in the United States or the USSR, outside the umbrella. The
Americans looked at it rather differently. “If the war goes badly inside this um-
brella,” an American would have said, “and if the Europeans want us to, we’ll
launch tactical nuclear weapons from Western Europe to Eastern Europe. Of
course, there may be retaliation, but all the nuclear devastation will be inside Eu-
rope, inside the umbrella.”
Today, fortunately, defending Western Europe is no longer a problem. Ac-
cordingly, U.S. strategic planners have conjured up new contingencies in which
the United States might wish to initiate nuclear war:
1 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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• To preclude the revival of a Soviet-type threat to Europe
• To respond to the use of biological weapons against U.S. forces
• To destroy underground headquarters, weapons, or weapon storage
• To repel a cross-Straits invasion of Taiwan by a force of massed Chinese
junks
• To repel a massive Chinese ground attack on South Korea
• To respond to, and thus deter, any sort of heinous act against the United
States.
There is no question that in every one of these instances—one might think of
others—a nuclear response would be more efficacious militarily than a conven-
tional one. But to consult Clausewitz again, war must have a political objective,
and it must not be waged in a way that defeats its political objective. This is hard
for people of the World War II generation to accept, having been raised in an era
of unconditional surrender. And subsequently we learned the wrong lesson
from Vietnam—that the military should never again let politicians pick targets,
as Lyndon Johnson did in that war. But who picked the targets in Kosovo in
1999? The political implications of targeting in Kosovo were so clear that any
military objections were very muted.
How is it, then, that planners today argue that the United States might use nu-
clear weapons in these six cases simply because they would be more effective
militarily? This is sloppy thinking—it overlooks the fact that political objections
will prevail. First, in all these instances (with the possible exception of conta-
gious biological weapons), a nuclear response would be considered dispropor-
tionate. Second, it has been over a half-century since nuclear weapons were used;
the uncertainties involved in unleashing them again would seem too great.
Third, it is not melodramatic to point out that at the extreme, the survival of hu-
mankind would be at risk. That a president of the United States would take the
moral responsibility of opening this Pandora’s box, not knowing where events
could lead, is beyond belief. Finally, and fortunately, alternatives are becoming
available—in the form of precision guided munitions (PGMs), as well as such
devices as remote-targeting systems that make PGMs easier to use.
If planners insist that the nation might willingly use nuclear weapons in sce-
narios like those above, precision conventional capabilities specifically tailored
to deal with them will not be developed. Take the cross-Straits invasion of Tai-
wan, for instance; to land a force of the size that would be needed, the People’s
Republic of China might have to send waves of wooden-hulled junks. It is very
difficult to sink a junk; to stop such an invasion, a specialized munition that
would go through a wooden hull and kill everyone inside would be very handy.
T U R N E R 1 9
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But such a thing cannot be conjured up at the last minute. It has to be thought
about in advance, beginning with the understanding that the incremental military
advantage of using nuclear over precision guided weapons in such a case would
not be worth the political cost.
GETTING TO TWO HUNDRED: STRATEGIC ESCROW
The United States, then, does not need a reserve of nuclear weapons to take the
offensive; and something in the neighborhood of two hundred nuclear war-
heads will do for deterrence and retaliation. How would we safely get down to a
nuclear arsenal of something like two hundred warheads? Today, the most imag-
inative approach is to finish the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START II), which takes each side down to 3,500 nuclear warheads (see table 2),
and then perhaps negotiate another agreement that will reduce warheads to two
thousand, or lower.
There are problems here. START II is stymied. The Russian Duma has passed
and ratified it, but with caveats concerning American national-missile-defense
developments. There is not
much chance that the U.S.
Senate (which ratified the
treaty in an earlier form in
1996) will accede to such
reservations. Even if ratified
in the same form by all par-
ties, START II is too slow; if
it went into effect today, the
reduction to 3,500 would
be completed only in 2007.
Too much can happen between now and then, as the Russian scene changes, and
as the Iraqs, Irans, and North Koreas of the world aspire to nuclear capabilities.
In any case, the 3,500 figure, which is so often invoked, is phony. The treaty
covers only nuclear warheads actually mounted on delivery vehicles. The United
States has said that in addition to the 3,500 permitted by the treaty it would also
keep 3,500 spares, which of course could be mounted on multiple-warhead ve-
hicles, and it has indicated that it will keep 3,000 tactical weapons, which are not
covered by the treaty at all. That makes a total of 10,000. Proportionally, if a
START III treaty reduced “covered” U.S. warheads to two thousand, the nation
would in fact possess five thousand. These reductions, whatever numbers we
choose, do nothing significant to reduce the threat to this country. If five hun-
dred nuclear weapons were launched against us, we would be just as dead as if
two or three thousand had been.
2 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
Date Number Remark
16 August 1945 0 Two expended
1949 c. 200 First Soviet test
1969 32,500 Peak
1989 6,000 START I target
1993 3,500 START II target




Turner: The Dilemma of Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-first Century
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
What can be done that would be more effective? One approach is called “stra-
tegic escrow.” The president would begin by directing the U.S. Strategic Com-
mand to take a thousand warheads off its ICBMs and put them in storage not
less than three hundred miles away. The president would invite the Russians to
send observers—not controllers—to count what goes into storage and remain
to see what goes out. Ideally, the Russians would reciprocate; in fact, they would
have to. Most reports—including
from Russian sources, borne out
by a statement by President Vladi-
mir Putin—indicate that the Rus-
sians today are nearly down to a
thousand usable intercontinental nuclear warheads. This is because since the
collapse of the Soviet Union they have not been refurbishing and replacing
them. It is in our interest in fact to get the size of the U.S. arsenal down to that of
the Russians because a growing disparity in numbers of usable warheads could
make the Russians feel so insecure that they might place their remaining nuclear
weapons on hair-trigger alert. Given American initiatives and Russian reciproca-
tion in a program of strategic escrow, in a matter of four to five years both sides
could be down to something like a thousand deliverable, ready warheads.
At that point, an arrangement would have to be negotiated with the other six
nuclear powers to create a “condominium” by which each of the eight states
would ultimately keep no more than two hundred warheads, all of them in es-
crow—none of them ready to fire, all of them subject to international verifica-
tion. Further, they would agree to work together to prevent the proliferation of
these weapons to other nations, including sharing intelligence information. Un-
der the condominium regime, there would be no nuclear weapons in the world
immediately ready to fire. The international observers at the storage sites would
warn if any one of the eight nuclear powers prepared weapons for use. At the
same time, any of the eight could bring weapons into readiness as a threat
against any other nation that acquired a nuclear capability and began threaten-
ing others with it.
The nuclear nations would move into this condominium state in a gradual
way, undergoing quite intrusive United Nations inspections. These nations
would not need to expose themselves to a surprise, disabling attack, even if some
other nation sequestered a few hundred warheads during a transitional period.
But then, squirreling away, say, two hundred nuclear warheads ready for use is
not a simple proposition; it means somehow hiding the same number of ICBMs
or other delivery vehicles, in addition to warheads. A nation considering doing
so would still face friction; even a two-to-one advantage does not guarantee total
protection.
T U R N E R 2 1
I came away with the conviction that if we had
sufficient nuclear weapons to hit an invisible
bridge in Bulgaria, we were overstocked.
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This process could produce a very stable world. If a Saddam Hussein acquired
a nuclear warhead and started threatening to use it, the nuclear nations would
simply bring warheads back from escrow. By acceding to the condominium the
nuclear powers would be telling each other, and the world, that though they
were not agreeing to abolish nuclear weapons, because it is impractical at this
point (though a condominium would be an achievable milestone on the path to
that desirable goal), they were accepting zero reliance on these weapons, zero
readiness for their immediate use, and zero chance of delivering a surprise at-
tack. A condominium will not lessen the lust of rogue leaders for nuclear weap-
ons, but it should temper the willingness of others to aid and abet their attempts
to obtain them. For instance, such a dramatic move on the part of the United
States and Russia would pressure third parties to put their economic interests af-
ter global security as well, by not selling materials of use in a nuclear program to
rogue states. Presently, our country, with its hoard of excess weapons, does not
appear serious about preventing proliferation and therefore does not get the co-
operation we need.
Of course, a Saddam Hussein may still use a weapon if he has one, but he will
have to take into account the hundreds of weapons poised out of his reach, able
to eliminate his country if their owners so decided. That is not a guarantee that
he will not deliver a nuclear attack, but it is as good as probably can be done.
If there is a reasonable alternative to a strategic escrow/condominium ar-
rangement, it certainly is not traditional arms-limitation agreements. The START
treaties are moribund; the United States has antagonized not only Russia and
China but a number of its allies, and it has no national missile defense program;
the United States has also expressly rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
These actions have killed the momentum of nuclear arms control and brought
U.S. leadership in this area into serious question.
A VERY DIFFERENT WORLD
There is an urgent need to move away from where we are. Why? We see a number
of ominous signs. Plainly, no one can tell where Russia will be in five or ten years.
So far, apparently no Russian weapons or fissile materials have leaked out, but
observers are worried; there could be much greater cause for worry if conditions
deteriorate further in Russia. In South Asia there is an unprecedented inflamma-
tory situation—two nuclear powers, Pakistan and India, who from time to time
go to war with each other. As for the Middle East, since December 1998 there
have been no UN inspectors in Iraq. When inspectors first went there in 1991,
they estimated that Iraq was only months away from a nuclear capability. How
far away can Iraq be now? Finally, there is evidence that Iran and North Korea
have been moving toward nuclear weapons as well.
2 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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What these developments portend is a world in which nuclear weapons pro-
liferate into the hands of someone who will actually use them. Given Iraq’s in-
tense rivalry with Iran and animosity to Israel, proliferation to Saddam Hussein
would mean the possibility of at least occasional use of nuclear weapons. This
would produce a very different world than the one we now live in. The attack
might not be on the United States, but it would change all the relationships
between humans and between nations: all dealings between them would be
clouded by the risk that a breakdown in relations could lead to nuclear devastation.
The world badly needs some imaginative approach like a condominium of the
nuclear powers under strategic escrow. It will not get one without rejecting the
propositions of conventional warfare that in decades past were transposed into
the nuclear era. In short, it is mandatory that the specious reasoning that has un-
derlain nuclear policies for over fifty years be corrected. The United States must
lead the world in this direction to forestall an era of occasional use of nuclear
weapons. After all, it was the United States that introduced these weapons. Be-
yond that, it is the only nation today with the stature, power, and wisdom to
manage a new nuclear-weapons regime.
One hopes that at war colleges today professors are teaching, and students are
learning, not simply contemporary facts but how to reason and analyze through
problems like this one better than the generations before have done. The United
States must deal with the nuclear problem in a much more rational way than it
has. If it is to do that, military officers, whether or not their duties take them into
this arcane field directly, must keep intellectually involved in this issue; the col-
lective impact of their thinking, speaking, and opinions will have an effect in the
future. The nation needs to be brought to understand that nuclear weapons are
generically different from conventional weapons. They are too powerful to be
used for anything but deterrence or—God help us—retaliation.
T U R N E R 2 3
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